Chilcott Enquiry....

[major.tom]

It's very good to see some light finally being shed on what we all knew was a trumped up case to go to war. I applaud GBR for not letting this go away. After millions of Iraqi lives have been taken, we certainly owe Iraq this much...

The truth will out.

[luke]

the guardian are doing a live blog today from the chilcot inquiry with eliza manningham-buller, who was director general of mi5

http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/blog/2010/jul/20/iraq-war-inquiry-iraq

[luke]

Iraq war inquiry: former UN expert accuses Whitehall of cover-up
Chilcot inquiry witness claims government is trying to suppress embarrassing testimony about case for Iraq invasion

A key witness to the Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq war has accused Whitehall of trying to silence embarrassing testimony undermining the case for the invasion.

In today's Observer, Carne Ross, the UK's Iraq expert at the UN between 1997 and 2002, writes that the inquiry is being prevented by "deep state" forces from establishing the government's true motivation for invading Iraq.

Ross, who appeared before the inquiry this month, says he was not provided with key documents relevant to his testimony and was warned by officials not to refer to an internal Foreign Office memo that contradicted the government's public case for war.

Before his appearance, large files were sent to him to read in confidence at the UK mission to the UN in New York, but "most of the key documents I had asked for were not there". In the hours before his appearance, Ross visited the Foreign Office, where he says "an official repeatedly sought to persuade me to delete references to certain documents in my testimony".

Ross claims he was told his evidence must not refer to a memo from a senior Foreign Office official. The memo, to the special adviser to the then foreign secretary, Jack Straw, expressed concern that a briefing paper for the parliamentary Labour party had "dramatically" altered the assessment of Iraq's nuclear threat. Ross says the "paper claimed that if Iraq's programmes remained unchecked, it could develop a workable nuclear device within five years. The official's memo pointed out that this was not in fact the UK assessment, which was more or less the opposite: that the UK believed that Iraq's nuclear programme had been effectively checked by sanctions."

Despite the official's concern, the paper was used to brief the cabinet. Ross writes: "This paper was pure overstated propaganda, filled with almost ludicrous statements like 'one teaspoon of anthrax can kill a million people'."

He expressed incredulity that the Foreign Office wanted references to the briefing removed from his testimony, as it related to a public document. "It is very worrying that the government machine is still trying to withhold key documents, and silence those of us with detailed knowledge of the policy history. I have been told too... that members of the [inquiry] panel have been refused documents they have specifically requested."

Simon Hughes, the Liberal Democrat deputy leader, said: "The Chilcot inquiry will not be credible if relevant documents that do not now threaten national security are kept from the inquiry and the public."

Ross said he had wanted to use his appearance to highlight how ministers failed to consider alternatives to military action. "I had asked for specific records relating to the UK's failure to deal with the so-called Syrian pipeline, through which Iraq illegally exported oil, sustaining the Saddam [Hussein] regime. I was told that specific documents, such as the records of prime minister [Tony] Blair's visit to Syria, could not be found. This is simply not plausible." He also asked for joint intelligence committee assessments on Iraq, some of which he helped prepare and all of which he had seen. "Only three were provided – 40 minutes before I was due before the Chilcot panel."

The claims come at the end of a week in which the former head of MI5, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, cast grave doubts on the case for invading Iraq and the deputy prime minister, Nick Clegg, described the invasion as "illegal".

A Cabinet Office spokesman said the inquiry was committed to being fair to all witnesses. "The inquiry wrote to Mr Ross four weeks prior to his appearance, highlighting that if he wished to refer to any specific documents he should notify the Iraq inquiry secretariat in advance so they could seek any necessary declassification. As Sir John Chilcot highlighted, Mr Ross did not ask in advance for any documents to be declassified."

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jul/25/chilcot-inquiry-iraq-cover-up-claim

Chilcot inquiry: Iraq expert Carne Ross claims civil servants are withholding vital documents
Britain's 'deep state' of secretive bureaucrats is denying witnesses to the Chilcot inquiry crucial files

I testified last week to the Chilcot inquiry. My experience demonstrates an emerging and dangerous problem with the process. This is not so much a problem with Sir John Chilcot and his panel, but rather with the government bureaucracy – Britain's own "deep state" – that is covering up its mistakes and denying access to critical documents.

There is only one solution to this problem, and it requires decisive action.

After I was invited to testify, I was contacted by the Foreign Office, from which I had resigned after giving testimony to the Butler inquiry in 2004, to offer its support for my appearance. I asked for access to all the documents I had worked on as Britain's Iraq "expert" at the UN Security Council, including intelligence assessments, records of discussions with the US, and the long paper trail on the WMD dossier.

Large files were sent to me to peruse at the UK mission to the UN. However, long hours spent reviewing the files revealed that most of the key documents I had asked for were not there.

In my testimony I had planned to detail how the UK government failed to consider, let alone implement, available alternatives to military action. To support this I had asked for specific records relating to the UK's failure to deal with the so-called Syrian pipeline, through which Iraq illegally exported oil, thereby sustaining the Saddam regime. I was told that specific documents, such as the records of prime minister Tony Blair's visit to Syria, could not be found. This is simply not plausible.

I had also asked for all the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments on Iraq, some of which I helped prepare. Of dozens of these documents, only three were provided to me – 40 minutes before I was due to appear before the Chilcot panel.

Playing by the rules, I had submitted my written testimony to Chilcot before my appearance. In the hours before my appearance, invited to visit the Foreign Office to see further documents (mostly irrelevant), an official repeatedly sought to persuade me to delete references to certain documents in my testimony.

He told me that the Cabinet Office wanted the removal of a critical reference in my evidence to a memo from a senior Foreign Office official to the foreign secretary's special adviser, in which the official pointed out, with mandarin understatement, that the paper sent that week to the Parliamentary Labour Party dramatically – and inaccurately – altered the UK's assessment of Iraq's nuclear threat.

In a clear example of the exaggeration of Iraq's military capabilities, that paper claimed that if Iraq's programmes remained unchecked, it could develop a nuclear device within five years.

The official's memo pointed out that this was not, in fact, the UK assessment: the UK believed that Iraq's nuclear programme had been checked by sanctions.

The paper to the PLP was instead sent by the foreign secretary to "brief" the wider cabinet. This paper was pure overstated propaganda, filled with ludicrous statements like "one teaspoon of anthrax can kill a million people". The paper was soon made public, as part of the campaign to create public hysteria.

The official's memo about the PLP paper contained nothing secret. It relates to a public document, the PLP paper. Yet, of all the references in my testimony, this was the one that the Cabinet Office most wanted removed. I refused. Strikingly, this memo has never been mentioned to the inquiry, including by its author, who testified earlier this year. Neither has the author of the PLP paper been questioned, or the paper itself discussed.

I was repeatedly warned by inquiry staff not to mention any classified material during my testimony. The only problem is that almost every document I ever wrote or read in my work was classified. It was made clear to me, and to journalists attending the hearing, that if I mentioned specific documents the broadcast of my testimony would be cut off. Other forms of retribution (Official Secrets Act prosecution?) hung in the air. It was a form of subtle intimidation.

Meanwhile, my requests to see documents about the infamous Number 10 WMD dossier were ignored, including requests for letters I had written.

This experience and the inquiry's record so far is cause for concern. It is clear from testimonies so far that most witnesses, most of whom went along with the war at the time, are offering a very one-sided account to the panel. A story is being peddled that sanctions on Iraq were collapsing and the allied policy of containment was failing. Thus, the military alternative to deal with the Iraqi threat was more or less unavoidable.

Though there is some truth to this argument, it was not what the Foreign Office, or the government as a whole, believed at the time. The true story is there to be seen in the documents. In memos, submissions to ministers and telegrams, the official view is very clear: while there was concern at the erosion of sanctions, containment had prevented Iraq from rearmament.

When invasion was promoted by Washington, the available alternative – to squeeze Saddam financially by stopping oil exports or seizing the regime's assets, which I and some colleagues had repeatedlyadvocated, was ignored. Here the documents tell a different but equally clear and appalling story: there is not a single mention of any formal discussion, by ministers or officials, of alternatives to military action. It is hard to pinpoint a graver indictment of the government's failure.

The oral testimonies delivered to the inquiry have not given an accurate picture of what the government really thought. Unfortunately, the panel is neither equipped, nor apparently inclined, to challenge witnesses on the contradictions of their testimonies with this documentary record. This may not be the panel's fault: how can they know which pertinent documents exist?

In these circumstances, it is very worrying that the government machine is still trying to withhold key documents, and silence those of us with detailed knowledge of the policy history – and documents. I have been told too, from secondary sources, that members of the panel have been refused documents they have specifically requested.

There is a clear solution to these problems: break down the continued obstruction by the bureaucracy by releasing the documents – all of them. Only the most secret documents deserve continued protection, and there are very few of these. The vast majority of relevant documents relate to policy discussion inside the government before the war. Though profoundly embarrassing, there is little here that damages national security, except in the hysterical assessment of officials protecting their own reputation. Nick Clegg said a few weeks ago that almost all documents must now be released. He is right.

Carne Ross was the UK's Iraq expert at the UN from 1997 to 2002. He now heads Independent Diplomat, a non-profit diplomatic advisory group.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jul/25/chilcot-iraq-carne-ross

[luke]

the guardian are doing a live blog from the chilcot inquiry where hans blix will be giving evidence

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/blog/2010/jul/27/hans-blix-iraq-inquiry-live

Hans Blix at the Iraq war inquiry - live
Live coverage as the UN's former chief weapons inspector gives evidence to the Chilcot panel

Hans Blix, the UN's former chief weapons inspector, who headed the team searching for Saddam's weapons from November 2002 until the eve of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, is this afternoon's witness at the Chilcot inquiry.

Here's a quick recap of events.

The central claim in the No 10 arms dossier that suggested Iraq could launch weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes was reported in September 2002.

UN resolution 1441, which required Saddam to cooperate with the UN weapons inspector, was unanimously agreed in Nov 2002.

In January 2003 - two months before the invasion of Iraq, UN inspectors had been to a number of key sites named by British and US intelligence and did not find any WMD. At the time Blix urged for more time for UN inspectors to do their job, but the request went unheeded.

Blix presented a report to the UN security council on 7 March 2003, and gave a verbal report to those present in which he said that Iraq was making progress, cooperating much more than it had been in early months, and destroying weapons. (Blix recently said that he personally expressed his scepticism to Blair that Saddam had WMD before the invasion in March, citing the failure of his inspectors to discover any WMD at any of the sites recommended by the US and UK intelligence). We all know what happened next.

The Swede, who was formally a diplomat and politician before being brought out of retirement to become 1st executive chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (2000 to 2003), has set out his stall on the events running up to the Iraq invasion on many occasions, so it will be interesting to see if we hear anything new in this afternoon's three-hour session.

[faceless]

I didn't realise Mr Blix was taking part - excellent. I imagine there's lots of rats out there who think of him as some kind of 'traitor' for not finding reasons to attack Iraq,

[faceless]

[luke]

John Prescott at the Iraq inquiry

• Prescott dismisses Iraq intelligence as 'tittle tattle'
• Former deputy PM says he believed invasion was legal

http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/blog/2010/jul/30/john-prescott-iraq-war-inquiry
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jul/30/lord-prescott-chilcot-inquiry

how can you think the case for war was based on 'tittle tattle' and still think it legal?!

[luke]

Tony Blair 'to be called back' to Iraq war inquiry to answer questions about 'gaps' in his evidence

Tony Blair is to be recalled by the Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq War to answer new questions about 'gaps' in the evidence he gave earlier this year.

The former Prime Minister is likely to be asked to clarify the political build-up to the 2003 American-led invasion.

He is also expected to further explain the legality of Britain's participation in the controversial war.

Sir John Chilcot will write to Mr Blair next month to ask him to attend a public hearing in early 2011, reported The Times.

During his six-hour testimony earlier this year, Mr Blair mounted a vigorous defence of the invasion and insisted he had no regrets over removing Saddam Hussein.

He denied he took the country to war on the basis of a 'lie' over the dictator's supposed weapons of mass destruction.

At the end of his session one member of the audience shouted: 'What, no regrets? Come on' while others heckled 'You are a liar', 'And a murderer'.

Sir John has previously explained that as his team pores through thousands of secret government documents relating to the Iraq invasion, should they find 'conflicts or gaps within the evidence' then they will recall witnesses.

Liam Fox, the current Defence Secretary, asked Sir John to recall Gordon Brown to the inquiry earlier this year after he was forced into an humiliating admission that he had slashed defence spending while British troops were at war in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The then-PM told MPs he had been wrong to tell the inquiry that defence spending under Labour was 'rising in real terms every year'.

In January, an unrepentant Mr Blair was heckled and jeered by families of Britain's war dead as he declared he had 'not a regret' about invading Iraq.

He made it clear he would do the same again and warned world leaders they may soon have to take similar decisions over Iran.

Despite the deaths of up to 700,000 Iraqis and 179 British troops, Mr Blair said he felt 'responsibility but not a regret' at the end of his six hours of evidence. There was no hint of remorse.

Saddam had been a 'monster' and it had been right to remove him even to prevent the 'possibility' that he could acquire weapons of mass destruction, Mr Blair said.

He warned that Iran's nuclear weapons programme now poses an even greater threat.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1323798/Tony-Blair-called-Iraq-war-inquiry-explain-gaps-evidence.html

[faceless]

I've never supported the death-penalty, but I don't see how Blair could be dealt with in any other way. The only question is the method - hanging, shooting, or throwing the fucker off a cliff?

[Brown Sauce]

send him to Broadmoor. Should get on well with the inmates.

[luke]

from wikileaks;

'Day also promised that the UK had "put measures in place to protect your interests" during the UK inquiry into the causes of the Iraq war. He noted that Iraq seems no longer to be a major issue in the U.S., but he said it would become a big issue -- a "feeding frenzy" -- in the UK "when the inquiry takes off"'

Iraq Inquiry told to "protect US interests"

The Ministry of Defence decided to influence the official inquiry into the Iraq War in order to "protect US interests", according to a classified US diplomatic cable released by whistleblower website Wikileaks.

A dispatch sent by Ellen Tauscher, the US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, describes a conversation with Jon Day, the MOD Director General for security policy, in which he "promised that the UK had ’put measures in place to protect your [US] interests’ during the UK inquiry into the causes of the Iraq War.

Day made the admission in late September 2009, during one of a series of meetings between Tauscher and senior British officials attending the London P5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures Towards Nuclear Disarmament.

The UK delegation also included David Miliband, then Foreign Secretary, although there is no evidence in the cable that he was aware of Day’s assurances.

On 6 January 2010, Day was called as a witness to the Iraq Inquiry where he was questioned about the MOD’s policy decisions from 2007 to 2009.

Day’s apparent knowledge of Whitehall interference into the Inquiry prior to his testimony contradicts the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s claim that it would be both "fully independent of Government" and "unprecedented" in scope.

At the news conference launching the Inquiry, chairman Sir John Chilcot was asked by Guardian Journalist Andrew Sparrow if the panel planned on taking evidence from American officials.

Chilcot replied, “Discussions and evidence sessions are not necessarily the same thing, and of course we have no power to compel witnesses here, let alone people in foreign governments. Nonetheless, I accept the thrust behind your question, that the Anglo-American relationship is one of the most central parts of this inquiry, and how that was conducted is something that we need to get a very strong understanding of.”

Between 17 and 21 May 2010, members of the committee held a series meetings in Washington DC with officials from the former and current US administrations. However, as the meetings were not formal evidence sessions, there is no published record of the discussions.

The Iraq Inquiry plans to deliver its final report at the end of the year.

http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/articles/2010/Iraq-Inquiry-told-to-protect-US.html

you can check the cable at the link below;

http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09LONDON2198.html

[luke]

[luke]

The damning of Tony Blair: Former PM to be held to account on Iraq in Chilcot report on war
Iraq war deal 'signed in blood' by former Prime Minister
Cabinet members kept in the dark in build-up to the war
'Obvious failings' in post-war planning

Tony Blair is to face scathing criticism from the official inquiry into the Iraq War for the role he played in leading Britain into one of its biggest foreign policy fiascos in modern history.

The Mail on Sunday has been told that the former Prime Minister will be held to account on four main failings:
* Bogus claims that were made about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction.
* Not telling the British public about his secret pledge with George Bush to go to war.
* Keeping the Cabinet in the dark by his ‘sofa government’ style.
*Failing to plan to avoid the post-war chaos in Iraq.

Well-placed sources say the reputations of Mr Blair and key allies will suffer major damage when the report by Sir John Chilcot’s Iraq War inquiry is published this autumn. Mr Blair, former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and ex-Downing Street spin doctor Alastair Campbell are all expected to be criticised.

All those taken to task by Chilcot’s five-strong panel of experts will receive notice in the next few weeks of the inquiry’s conclusions. They will be given a final chance to respond to their alleged failings before the report is finalised. Although it has not yet been written, clear indications have been given as to which areas it will focus on.

The damning verdict of the Chilcot Inquiry comes eight years after Mr Blair went to war against Saddam Hussein with George Bush. A total of 179 British soldiers died in Iraq while estimates for the number of Iraqi dead vary from 100,000 to 650,000. Although Saddam was toppled within weeks, the invasion led to a bloody aftermath and there were claims that it contributed to increased terrorism in the UK and elsewhere.

The Chilcot Inquiry, set up by then Prime Minister Gordon Brown two years ago, is the third inquiry into the conflict. It followed the Butler Inquiry into the intelligence failings and the Hutton Inquiry into the death of Ministry of Defence weapons expert Dr David Kelly. Inquiry chairman, former civil servant Sir John Chilcot, 72, was asked to conduct a more searching investigation spanning the period from 2001, two years before the war, right through to 2009.

The Mail on Sunday understands that the inquiry rounds on Mr Blair for telling Parliament that intelligence suggesting Saddam had WMDs was ‘beyond doubt’. In evidence, a defiant Mr Blair said he had no regrets about the war and maintained Britain would ultimately be able to look back on it with ‘immense pride’. But he admitted he had misunderstood the claim in a Downing Street dossier that Saddam could launch WMDs in 45 minutes. He also conceded there was not a ‘growing’ threat from Saddam in the autumn of 2002 – despite stating precisely that in the Commons before the war.

The inquiry report is also expected to criticise spin doctor Mr Campbell, whose denial that the dossier on Saddam’s weapons was designed to ‘make the case for war’ was challenged by former spy chief Major-General Michael Laurie, who was head of intelligence collection for the Defence Intelligence Agency. Major-General Laurie told the inquiry two months ago: ‘Alastair Campbell said the purpose of the dossier was not “to make a case for war”. I had no doubt at that time this was exactly its purpose and these very words were used. We knew at the time that its purpose was precisely to make a case for war, rather than setting out the available intelligence. I and those involved in its production saw it exactly as that, and that was the direction we were given.’

And earlier this month an unnamed MI6 officer said Mr Campbell acted like ‘an unguided missile’ in work on the intelligence dossier. The spin doctor had ‘a propensity to have rushes of blood to the head and pass various stories and information to journalists without appropriate prior consultation’.

The inquiry is also understood to focus on the way that Mr Blair privately told Mr Bush more than a year before the conflict that he would back the war, while claiming in public he had not made up his mind. Mr Blair denied that a deal to go to war had been ‘signed in blood’ at President Bush’s Texas ranch in 2002. He said they merely agreed to ‘deal’ with Saddam.

However, a rift between Mr Blair and Mr Straw over whether the UK supported ‘regime change’ will also feature prominently in Chilcot’s conclusions. Furthermore, Mr Straw is in the line of fire after saying he only ‘very reluctantly’ endorsed the war, but ignored warnings from Foreign Office legal advisers that it was illegal. Sir Michael Wood, former senior legal adviser at the Foreign Office, said he considered resigning in protest at the war and was sidelined after he objected. Mr Blair’s ‘sofa government’ style, whereby key decisions on the war were made in his study by a small circle of confidants – with most Cabinet Ministers and officials excluded – is also expected to be condemned.

Former Cabinet Secretaries Lord Wilson and Lord Turnbull, who both served under Mr Blair, told of their failed pleas to Mr Blair to rely on traditional Cabinet committees. Lord Turnbull said the Cabinet was not asked to approve the war until the eve of the invasion in March 2003, by which time they were ‘imprisoned’ and had little choice but to agree – or see Mr Blair ousted.

The failure to anticipate the post-war turmoil that followed Saddam’s defeat is believed to be another major part of Chilcot’s conclusions. The inquiry heard how Major-General Tim Cross, a senior British officer, asked Mr Blair to delay the invasion of Iraq two days before the conflict, partly because planning for afterwards was ‘woefully thin’.

Major-General Cross said: ‘I remember saying, in so many words, I have no doubt at all that we will win this military campaign. I do not believe that we are ready for post-war Iraq. When he arrived in Baghdad after the war, things were worse than he expected. ‘Baghdad was held together by chicken wire and chewing gum,’ he said.

Last night sources close to Mr Blair said that they were aware of the kind of criticism he was likely to face. A spokesman for the Chilcot Inquiry said: ‘We will not provide a running commentary on the inquiry.’ A source close to the inquiry said reports that Mr Blair would be heavily criticised were ‘speculation’. A spokesman for Tony Blair said: ‘This is a deliberate attempt to pre-judge a report that hasn't even been written yet. We're not going comment until it has been published.’

How Chilcot put Blair on the rack

IRAQ WAR DEAL ‘SIGNED IN BLOOD’ BY BLAIR

The inquiry pursued a claim that a deal was ‘signed in blood’ by Mr Blair at Mr Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas, in 2002, a year before the war – while Mr Straw denied regime change was considered.

Panel member Sir Roderic Lyne asked Mr Straw: ‘What Mr Blair said about Crawford was very simple – Saddam either had a change of heart or regime change was on the agenda. He says it is on the agenda, you say it was off. Weren’t you and the Prime Minister aiming for different objectives?’

SOFA GOVERNMENT

Inquiry member Sir Lawrence Freedman challenged the way Cabinet Ministers were kept in the dark in the build-up to the war.
His colleague Sir Roderic said: ‘Would the board of any company ever be asked to take collective responsibility for a major strategic decision without a single paper or discussion in a board committee?’

DODGY INTELLIGENCE DOSSIERS

Sir John Chilcot said Mr Blair’s claim that the secret services had established ‘beyond doubt’ that Saddam had WMD ‘was not possible to make on the basis of intelligence’.

When Mr Blair insisted: ‘I did believe it, frankly, beyond doubt,’ Sir Lawrence said: ‘Beyond your doubt, but beyond anybody’s doubt?’ Sir Roderic suggested Mr Blair had ‘misled Parliament’.

POST-WAR BLUNDERS

Inquiry member Baroness Prashar questioned Mr Blair on ‘obvious failings’ in post-war planning. There was ‘so much concentration on the (military) campaign planning that attention wasn’t paid to the aftermath.’

She told Mr Straw: ‘The U.S. was dysfunctional . . . yet we continued to assume they would sort it out. It wasn’t for want of people drawing it to the attention of the Prime Minister. Why did we not pay enough attention to that?’

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2020625/Chilcot-inquiry-Tony-Blair-held-account-Iraq-War.html